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Preface 
The primary goal of the ILO is to contribute, with member States, to achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, a goal 
embedded in the ILO Declaration 2008 on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, and1 
which has now been widely adopted by the international community. 
In order to support member States and the social partners to reach the goal, the ILO 
pursues a Decent Work Agenda which comprises four interrelated areas: Respect for 
fundamental worker’s rights and international labour standards, employment promotion, 
social protection and social dialogue. Explanations of this integrated approach and related 
challenges are contained in a number of key documents: in those explaining and elaborating 
the concept of decent work2, in the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), and in 
the Global Employment Agenda. 
The Global Employment Agenda was developed by the ILO through tripartite 
consensus of its Governing Body’s Employment and Social Policy Committee. Since its 
adoption in 2003 it has been further articulated and made more operational and today it 
constitutes the basic framework through which the ILO pursues the objective of placing 
employment at the centre of economic and social policies.3 
The Employment Sector is fully engaged in the implementation of the Global 
Employment Agenda, and is doing so through a large range of technical support and 
capacity building activities, advisory services and policy research. As part of its research 
and publications programme, the Employment Sector promotes knowledge-generation 
around key policy issues and topics conforming to the core elements of the Global 
Employment Agenda and the Decent Work Agenda. The Sector’s publications consist of 
books, monographs, working papers, employment reports and policy briefs.4 
The Employment Working Papers series is designed to disseminate the main findings 
of research initiatives undertaken by the various departments and programmes of the 
Sector. The working papers are intended to encourage exchange of ideas and to stimulate 
debate. The views expressed are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the ILO. 
                                                     
1
 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/download/dg_announce_en.pdf 
2
 See the successive Reports of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference: 
Decent work (1999); Reducing the decent work deficit: A global challenge (2001); Working out of 
poverty (2003). 
3
 See http://www.ilo.org/gea. And in particular: Implementing the Global Employment Agenda: 
Employment strategies in support of decent work, “Vision” document, ILO, 2006. 
4
 See http://www.ilo.org/employment. 
 José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs 
Executive Director 
Employment Sector 
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Foreword 
At the 99th session of the International Labour Conference, constituents endorsed the 
need to promote a ‘pro-employment’ macroeconomic framework. It was felt that the 
current framework, while making an important contribution to the goal of macroeconomic 
stability, paid insufficient attention to the way in which macroeconomic policy instruments 
either helped or hindered employment creation and poverty reduction. In the standard 
framework that has evolved since the days of the structural adjustment programmes of the 
1980s and 1990s and that has remained intact during the 2000s, the emphasis is on 
attaining key nominal targets pertaining to debts, deficits and inflation. The rationale is that 
attaining such targets in the medium to long run will engender a predictable 
macroeconomic environment that is crucial for supporting growth and hence employment 
creation. It now appears that macroeconomic stability is necessary, but by no means 
sufficient to engender inclusive, job-rich growth. 
The ILO/Korea partnership programme has been providing additional support to the 
Employment Policy Department’s endeavour to identify existing constraints in the 
macroeconomic policy instruments that may hinder generation of full and productive 
employment, and to suggest a way forward for job-rich growth. A series of country case 
studies has been conducted, and the current case study of Malawi represents one result. It 
analyzes recent macroeconomic performance, shows their relationship with employment 
outcomes or lack thereof, reviews the existing programmes on employment and social 
safety nets, and reflects the views of the ILO constituency and other key national 
stakeholders that were collected through consultations. 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world, with poverty widespread at 40 
per cent in 2009. Rural subsistence agriculture still dominates as a source of livelihood for 
the majority of the population. Malawi has experienced a drastic reduction in inflation rate 
since 2004, but until then, the inflation rate reached double-digit for a long period of time, 
driven largely by the exchange rate that strongly influenced consumer prices. It reflected 
the structural weakness of the economy, as well as vulnerable external account situation. In 
order to generate productive employment opportunities, the economy has to diversify from 
low-productivity subsistence agriculture and narrow export base, consisting mainly of 
tobacco, towards other agricultural food and cash crops and non-primary export sectors. In 
order to do so, the paper concretely recommends adjustments to the monetary, fiscal and 
external sector policies that would support the much needed diversification process. They 
include reduction in commercial banks’ excess liquidity, greater expenditure on skills and 
capability development, improved revenue mobilization, and devaluation of the Malawi 
Kwacha. 
The paper was presented and discussed in a national workshop in November 2010 
opened by the Hon. Minister of Labour and attended by the representatives of the 
Employers’ and Workers’ organizations. The paper reflects the valuable and concrete 
views that were actively expressed by the participants. We are grateful to the ILO Country 
Office for the Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique for providing valuable support in 
organizing and conducting the workshop. 
 Azita Berar Awad 
Director 
Employment Policy Department 
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1 
Introduction 
This paper investigates the links between macroeconomic policy and employment 
creation in Malawi. It identifies ways in which monetary, fiscal and external sector 
policies (dealing with the exchange rate and the capital account) can be used to boost 
employment creation in Malawi.  
The prevailing orthodoxy on macroeconomic policy focuses on stabilisation and on 
maintaining internal and external balance. This is seen as the optimal way to create 
conditions conducive to rapid economic growth, which in turn boosts employment. This 
paper departs from the orthodoxy and argues that a developing country such as Malawi 
can use macroeconomic policies that go beyond narrow stabilisation. We identify a range 
of macroeconomic policy instruments that can help direct the Malawian economy onto a 
path of employment-creating economic growth.  
Section One presents the thematic background for our study. Section Two deals 
with the key features of growth, poverty and employment in the Malawian economy.  
Section Three outlines the macroeconomic policy environment in the country. 
Section Four examines monetary policy options for enhancing employment-rich growth. 
Section Five examines fiscal policy options for job creation. Section Six deals with 
exchange rate, capital account and other external sector policy options for boosting 
economic growth and employment. Section Seven summarises the main conclusions of 
the report.  
Section one 
Thematic background 
The orthodox approach to macroeconomic policy in developing countries focuses 
on stabilisation. Maintaining internal and external equilibrium is seen as the main aim of 
macroeconomic policy. This results in policy targets of curbing inflation, containing the 
fiscal deficit and enabling the emergence of market-clearing exchange rates. This view 
assumes that a stable macroeconomic environment, together with a non-interventionist 
state that does not crowd out private investment, will generate faster economic growth.  
However, the theoretical underpinnings of this orthodoxy have been questioned 
extensively (Rodrik 2006, 2009). The positive causal link between macroeconomic 
stabilisation and economic growth remains ambiguous. Economic growth may not 
always follow once ‘correct’ incentives and a stable environment are created. The links 
between stabilisation and employment growth are even more tenuous. Even in instances 
where stabilisation is accompanied by faster growth, this growth will not necessarily be 
employment boosting.  
There is also little empirical evidence to support the central hypotheses of the 
orthodoxy. For instance, the claim that holding inflation below 5 per cent (or even below 
10 per cent) promotes growth does not hold up to empirical testing. Therefore, the zeal 
with which stabilisation policies have dwelt on this target is questionable. Indeed, it has 
been widely argued that excessive focus on inflation targets has hampered economic 
growth by restricting the policy space available to use fiscal instruments to boost 
investment and stabilise output during downturns (Ocampo 2009).  
Focusing only on inflation and on deficits also results in too narrow a view of 
stabilisation. For developing countries beset by structural weaknesses and market 
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imperfections, stabilisation needs to be defined more broadly to include stability and 
growth in the real economy. Such stability in the real economy may sometimes require 
allowing larger fiscal deficits and higher rates of inflation than prescribed by 
conventional macro policy.  
While conventional macroeconomic policy only allows a stabilising role for fiscal 
policy, fiscal policy can be used as an explicit tool of employment creation and poverty 
reduction. The MDG agenda highlighted the structure of government expenditure and 
emphasised the need for pro-poor budgets. This indeed led to a dramatic increase in 
social sector spending across much of the developing world. However, it sometimes also 
resulted in an under-allocation of government expenditure for economic sectors. It is 
important therefore re-emphasise the importance of state expenditure on economic 
sectors which can generate employment-creating economic growth. 
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Section two 
The economy of Malawi: Key features 
Malawi, a landlocked and densely-populated nation in Southern Africa, is one of the 
poorest countries in the world. Malawi’s GDP per capita in 2009 was US$ 344 (IMF 
2009). Poverty is widespread. In 2009 it was estimated that 40 per cent of Malawi’s 
population lived in poverty (National Statistical Office 2010). The population of Malawi 
is mainly rural and subsistence agricultural production dominates. Malawi is also highly 
aid-dependent. Foreign grants made up 44 per cent of the national budget in 2008/2009.  
2.1 Trends in Growth and Structural Change 
a) Economic growth 
After experiencing low economic growth rates for much of the period since the 
early 1980s, Malawi has shown a growth turnaround in recent years. GDP growth rates 
averaged around 7 per cent per annum between 2005 and 2009. Although this recent 
performance is good by any standards, Malawi’s growth has a history of volatility 
(Figure 1 and Table 1).  
Figure 1. Growth rates 1960-2010 
 
Source: Mangani (2009). 
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Table 1. GDP growth rates 
Period Rate of GDP growth 
1966-1969 8.4 
1970-1974 8.6 
1975-1979 5.5 
1980-1984 1.0 
1985-1989 3.0 
1990-1994 
 
0.4 
1995-1999 7.4 
2000-2004 1.6 
2005-2008 6.5 
2008-2009 9.7 
2009-2010 7.7 
 
Source: World Development Indictors 2010  
 
 
b) Economic structure 
The Malawian economy is predominantly agricultural. While Table 2 shows that 
agriculture’s share in total GDP has declined during the last two decades (accounting for 
34 per cent of GDP in 2009, down from 50 per cent in 1988), agriculture still supports 
around 85 per cent of livelihoods. This sector is also the main source of export earnings.  
The contribution of manufacturing to total GDP has declined slightly in past twenty 
years. Manufacturing in Malawi consists largely of agro-processing. The service sector 
has greatly expanded its share of GDP, from 26 per cent in 1988 to 45 per cent in 2008. 
Output in this sector is dominated by wholesaling and retailing. 
Table 2. Economic structure 
 1988 1998 2007 2009 
Agriculture 50 35.6 34.3 34.3 
Industry 24 18 20.3 20.4 
Manufacturing 15.8 13.6 14.2 14.4 
Services 26 46.1 45.1 45.1 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2010 
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Agricultural growth rates, while averaging only 1.00 for the ten year period  
1998–2008, have improved drastically in the past few years. This sector grew by 6 per 
cent in 2007 and 5.2 per cent in 2008 (Table 3). Manufacturing growth rates have also 
improved in the period 2007-2009, reflecting increased output in agro-processing. As 
Figure 2 shows however, there is considerable year-on-year variation in agricultural 
growth, with the standard deviations for growth in each time period being high. This 
reflects the weather and imported input dependence of this sector. 
Table 3. Sectoral growth rates 
 1988-98 1998-08 2007 2008 2009 
Agriculture 6.2 1.00 5.9 5.2  
Industry 2.7 3.1 8.5 6.0  
Manufacturing 1.7 1.1 9.3 6.4  
Services 2.3 3.0 4.0 4.9  
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2010 
 
Figure 2. Sectoral growth rates  
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Source: Derived from World Bank Country at a Glance Malawi tables.  
c) The role of maize in the Malawian economy  
Maize is the primary domestic agricultural crop in Malawi. Around 80 per cent of 
maize cultivation is done by smallholders for subsistence . The Poverty and Vulnerability 
Assessment (World Bank, 2006) estimates that only 10-15 per cent of the total crop is 
sold, that around half (52 per cent) of small holders sell some of their output on the 
market, but that only 18 per cent sell more than half of their output. 
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Maize production is promoted through an extensive input subsidy which is the 
central plank of the Malawi government’s social sector strategy. While agriculture is 
allocated around 14 per cent of the total national budget, around 80 per cent of the 
agricultural budget was spent on the input subsidy in 2009.  
Several studies have shown that the input subsidy programme is an important 
determinant of food security in Malawi. (DfiD 2008). Complemented by favourable 
rainfall conditions, Malawi has registered surplus national maize production since 2006, 
even managing to export some of the surplus grain in 2007.  
There has been debate in Malawi around the extent to which maize production 
drives economic growth. Much of the research points to the conclusion that, while central 
to welfare, maize does not dominate the dynamics of economic growth. One explanation 
for this limited correlation between maize output and GDP growth is the high proportion 
of output which is consumed by the producer and which never reaches the market. 
Hence, although clear that very poor harvests are associated with contractions in output 
the correlation is weaker in years of good harvest. Maize contributes to GDP – by 
definition – but strong maize harvests alone do not inevitably create strong overall 
growth. 
d) A narrow concentration of exports 
Tobacco which is Malawi’s main cash crop is also the country’s main export. The 
share of tobacco in total exports is around 60 per cent. Malawi’s export basket therefore 
is highly concentrated in a few products, leaving the country highly vulnerable to 
demand changes and terms of trade shocks. Just four crops (Tobacco, tea, sugar and 
cotton) account for 75 per cent of exports.  
The composition of exports has not changed significantly over time. There has been 
virtually no change in the export basket since 1994, apart from the nascent incursions of 
apparel, cotton and edible nuts (Figure 3) . These have expanded at an average per capita 
rate of 11 per cent since 1994 but combined still account for less than one tenth of total 
revenue. 
Figure 3. Export Trends 
 
Source: National Statistical Office (various) 
This lack of export diversification is a key weakness of the economy. It puts heavy 
reliance on the tobacco sector and commits the economy to growth constrained by world 
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demand for a niche product. While recent economic growth rates can partly be explained 
by rises in the tobacco price, the economy remains vulnerable to adverse future price 
shocks. Expansion of tobacco production does not appear to be a viable export strategy 
for the medium to long term. The majority of Malawi’s tobacco crop is burley which is 
used mainly as a neutral flavoured filler in the market for high-end cigarettes. Although 
expanding, there is a ceiling on world demand for such tobacco. 
The high level of export concentration is further revealed in Table 4. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index for Malawi is 0.625, compared with an average of 0.40 for 
developing countries. 
Table 4 Malawi Relative Structure of the External Sector (Current Account) 
  2000     2009     
  No. of 
Products 
Exported/ 
Imported 
Diversification 
Index 
Concentration 
Index 
Number of 
Products 
Exported/ 
imported 
Diversification 
Index 
Concentration 
Index 
Exports             
    WORLD 261.000 0.000 0.074 260.000 0.000 0.071 
    DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 261.000 0.262 0.129 260.000 0.228 0.120 
    TRANSITION ECONOMIES 261.000 0.568 0.207 260.000 0.560 0.324 
    DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 260.000 0.132 0.071 260.000 0.174 0.060 
    Developing Economies Africa 260.000 0.608 0.350 260.000 0.577 0.400 
    Eastern Africa 243.000 0.730 0.134 260.000 0.668 0.130 
    MALAWI 70.000 0.805 0.585 111.000 0.809 0.625 
    Mozambique 214.000 0.788 0.307 236.000 0.734 0.322 
    South Africa 260.000 0.544 0.141 253.000 0.582 0.145 
             
    WORLD 261.000 0.000 0.073 260.000 0.000 0.071 
    DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 261.000 0.178 0.088 260.000 0.170 0.087 
    TRANSITION ECONOMIES 259.000 0.310 0.059 259.000 0.243 0.051 
    DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 260.000 0.074 0.077 260.000 0.103 0.075 
    Developing Economies Africa 260.000 0.279 0.061 260.000 0.276 0.065 
    Eastern Africa 259.000 0.411 0.090 260.000 0.391 0.104 
    MALAWI 183.000 0.533 0.143 252.000 0.490 0.118 
    Mozambique  256.000 0.440 0.070 257.000 0.490 0.113 
    South Africa 260.000 0.298 0.132 259.000 0.240 0.142 
  
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Financial and Economic Reviews 
Note: Diversification Index is computed in terms of difference of structure of trade from world average, ranging 0-1 with 1 for big difference. 
Concentration Index is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index and lies between 0 and 1 (highest concentration). 
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e) A high level of import-dependence  
The Malawian economy is also highly import-dependent (Table 5). Imports of 
consumer goods, food and “other manufactures” account for 40 per cent of the total value 
of merchandise imports, well in excess of capital goods imports.  
Table 5 The structure of imports 
 Imports/GDP (2009 %) 42 
Food Imports/Total Imports (%) 15 
Fuels as % Total Imports 11 
Manufactures as % Total Imports 72 
  Of which  
  chemicals  22 
   machinery 25 
   other 25 
Source: UNCTAD 2010 
 
 
 
    
f) Low productivity in agriculture   
Agricultural productivity has shown little improvement in the past decade. Maize 
production is also marked by low productivity levels, reflecting insufficient irrigation 
and weak technologies. While potential yields for hybrid maize range from 5 to 8 tons 
per hectare, average actual yields in Malawi have been around 1.5 tons and rarely 
reached more than 2.5 tons. Productivity levels in tobacco cultivation are also low. 
Currently, tobacco yields are around one tonne per hectare, lower than many other 
African countries (Figure 4).  
Figure 4  Average maize and tobacco yields per hectare 
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g) Limited Irrigation and Infrastructure  
Agricultural production in Malawi is mainly rain-fed. Irrigation in Malawi is scarce 
and only 27 per cent of potential land is irrigated. The dependence on rain-fed agriculture 
makes the output performance of this sector highly volatile. Malawi farmers rarely use 
even low cost, technologically simple means of irrigation, reflecting their inability (due 
to a lack income, mainly) to undertake even such small investments.   
Historically Malawi has experienced serious droughts (1992, 1994, 1997, 2002, 
2005) and floods, both of which have impeded agricultural productivity, damaging both 
agricultural land and crops. This rainfall variability is thought to have intensified risk-
averse behaviour by farmers and investors in agricultural industries and services, limiting 
diversification into other cash crops. 
Infrastructure in Malawi is poor. As a landlocked country, Malawi is marked by 
very high transport costs, amongst the highest in the world (Figure 5). Road conditions 
have improved significantly since 2004 but are still inadequate. In 2007, 33 per cent of 
the total road network was in good condition compared to 24per cent recorded in 2006. 
Improvement in road infrastructure is the result of active donors’ support, notably that of 
the European Union. Much of this upgrading however has been of main roads. Unpaved 
roads that serve the majority of the population remain in poor condition, making it 
difficult for farmers to move their crops for sale and making them dependent on local 
traders who pay lower than market prices. 
The state of power infrastructure is also poor, impacting on returns to investment 
and constraining new investment. As Figure 6 indicates Malawi had the highest level of 
sales losses due to power outages, compared with other sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
Figure 5.  Transports Costs  
0% 20% 40% 60%
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Source: African Development Bank 2009 
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Figure 6.  Electricity Supply Shortfalls 
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Source: African Development Bank (2009) 
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2.2 Trends in employment and poverty  
a) Widespread poverty and a high incidence of rural poverty 
Poverty in Malawi is widespread. In 2009 it was estimated that 40 per cent of 
Malawi’s population lived in poverty. This, however, is an improvement over the  
54 per cent poverty rate recorded in 2004 (National Statistical Office NSO 2009).  
While the overall incidence of poverty in Malawi is around 40 per cent, rural 
poverty is significantly higher than urban poverty. The incidence of rural poverty in 2008 
was 44 per cent, as compared with a 13 per cent incidence of urban poverty. Urban 
poverty has fallen more rapidly than rural poverty in recent years. While rural poverty 
fell from 56 to 44 per cent between 2005 and 2008, urban fell from 25 per cent to  
13 per cent in the same period.  
Table 7. The Incidence of Poverty in Malawi 
  
b) Low levels of human development 
Multi-dimensional poverty is also widespread and human development levels in 
Malawi are low. Malawi’s Human Development Index (HDI) value for 2010 is 0.385, 
which puts it in the low human development category and positions the country at 153 
out of 169 countries and areas. Between 1980 and 2010, Malawi’s HDI value increased 
from 0.258 to 0.385, an increase of 49 per cent or average annual increase of about  
1.3 per cent. Table reviews Malawi’s progress in each of the HDI indicators. Between 
1980 and 2010, Malawi’s life expectancy at birth increased by about 10 years, mean 
years of schooling increased by almost 3 years 4 and expected years of schooling 
increased by about 4 years. Malawi’s GNI per capita increased by 21 per cent during the 
same period. 
However, Malawi’s 2010 HDI of 0.385 is below the average of 0.389 for countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also below the average of 0.393 for low human development 
countries. 
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Table 6. Human Development Malawi 
 
Source: Human Development Report, UNDP, 2010 
c) High levels of underemployment 
Current data on unemployment and employment in Malawi is largely non-existent. 
A Labour Force Survey has not been undertaken since 1993. Existing employment data 
is based on small household surveys that aim to capture welfare and therefore give little 
indication of the true incidence of underemployment. However, high levels of absolute 
poverty indicate that large segments of the population lack regular, paid work. 
d) The informal sector as key source of jobs 
Malawi’s workforce is mainly engaged in informal work, again reflecting the 
prevalence of small holder agriculture. It is estimated that around 90 per cent total 
working population in engaged in the informal sector. Women are less likely to be 
engaged in formal sector work than men. Women’s share of wage employment is only  
20 per cent (ILO 2010). The vast majority (90 per cent) of women work in the 
‘agriculture, forestry and fisheries’ sector.  
The only survey that primarily focuses on the informal sector is the Malawi 
National Gemini Micro and Small Scale Enterprise (MSE) Survey from 2000 (NSO, 
2001). It covered firms with less than 50 employees and on-farm agricultural activities as 
long as 50 per cent of the production was sold and the household earned more than MK 
6,000 from the sale of the produce. The survey thus included both mlimi who sell a large 
part of their harvest, and small firms, capturing small-scale private businesses which 
mainly is in the informal sector.  
MSE‘s employed over 1.7 million people in 2000, which was 38 per cent of the 
total labour force. Many of these were of course smallholder farmers, but the off-farm 
enterprises employed as many as 22 per cent of the labour force. This reflects the low 
commercialization rate among smallholders; most of them sell much less than 50 per cent 
of their produce. Women made up over 40 per cent of the employees, and 80 per cent of 
the MSEs were located in the rural areas (NSO 2001). 
e) Widespread employment in micro and small enterprises 
Micro and small enterprises (MSEs) employed around 38 per cent of the labour 
force in 2008 (ILO 2009). Nearly 80 per cent of micro and small enterprises are in rural 
areas, many of them farms. However, off-farm MSEs accounted for around 22 per cent 
of rural employment. 
The size distribution of enterprises in Malawi shows a duality – with concentration 
in micro/small size ranges and in the larger ranges. Employment in medium-sized 
enterprises is limited, partly indicating that MSEs rarely graduate into medium-sized 
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firms. Expanding this ‘missing middle’ in the enterprise size distribution could have 
positive implications for employment creation.   
f) Low wage levels and low levels of labour productivity  
Wages in Malawi are low. For instance, the monthly wage of a farm worker in 
Malawi is half that of a farm worker in Mozambique (ILO 2009). In addition, wage 
differentials across economic sectors are very high. An agricultural worker earns only 
about 4 per cent of the monthly average wage in the banking sector.  
The productivity of Malawi’s workforce is low. Labour productivity growth was 
negative between the years 2000 and 2004 and showed a positive increase of 4.6 per cent 
during 2005-2008.  
g) Large gaps in education attainment 
There is a wide gap in education attainment in Malawi. The primary school 
attendance rate reasonably high -88 per cent for girls and 82 per cent for boys. Secondary 
school attendance, however, is very low - 22 per cent rate for girls and 25 per cent rate 
for boys (NSO 2009).  
 Private rates of return to higher education are very high due to the scarcity of 
highly skilled workers (Figure 7). Chirwa and Matita (2009) found that an additional 
year of university education in Malawi leads to a 62 and 86 per cent wage increase for 
employed males and females respectively. One more year of TEVET education leads to 
20 and 28 per cent wage increase for males and females respectively.  
Figure 7 Rates of Return to Education 
 
The supply of vocational and technical skills in Malawi is very limited. Available 
data shows that at 35 TEVET students per 100,000 inhabitants, Malawi has the lowest 
number of technical and vocational students relative to comparator countries. This is 
reflected in the high proportion of unskilled workers in sectors such as manufacturing 
which we noted above.  
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This serious dearth of secondary education and technical skills in Malawi indicates 
a ‘missing middle’ in the distribution of skill levels.  
h) Limited access to finance for the poor 
The rural economy in Malawi is characterized by missing markets, in particular for 
credit. Most smallholders farmers lack access to formal lending sources.  
As Table 8 shows commercial bank lending to the agricultural sector as a proportion 
of total bank lending fell from 26.5 per cent in 1990 to 10.8 per cent in 2009. The 
dramatic increase in credit to ‘community, social and personal services’ (from  
1.9 per cent of total credit in 1990 to 30 per cent in 2009), partly reflects lending for 
private consumption, a big chunk of which is import oriented.  
Table 8.  Commercial Bank Lending to Key Sectors (as a percentage of total commercial bank 
advances) 
 Agriculture Manufacturing 
Community, Social 
and Personal 
Services 
Wholesale and retail 
Trade 
1990 26.5 22.6 1.9 33.7 
1995 28.5 25.6 4.3 19.4 
2000 7.5 18.5 2.1 16.9 
2005 9.8 13.3 14.5 14.9 
2009 10.8 13.8 30.0 11.8 
 
Source: Computed from Reserve Bank of Malawi, Financial and Economic Review 2010 
2.3 Structural change to create more and better jobs in Malawi 
Economic growth that brings with it sustained employment creation requires 
structural change. We identify five types of structural change that are required for 
generating job-rich growth in Malawi.  
1. Diversification within agriculture by reducing the importance of maize in total 
agricultural output and increasing the importance of other food crops and cash crops. 
2. Diversification away from agriculture by reducing the share of agriculture in total 
GDP and increasing the share of rural and urban non-farm sectors. 
3. Diversification of the export sector by reducing dependence on a single product, 
namely tobacco, and by encouraging export sectors with higher value added and greater 
downstream and upstream linkages to the domestic economy – for instance, an integrated 
cotton and textile industry. It is important that Malawi steps onto the first rungs of the 
ladder of international comparative advantage in non-primary commodities.  
4. Reducing the duality in the size distribution of farm and non-farm enterprises, thereby 
addressing the problem of the ‘missing enterprise middle’.  
5.Changing the distribution of skills across the population so as to rectify the existing 
duality of a small number of highly skilled workers and a large number of workers with 
basic skills by increasing middle level skills.  
In this paper we argue that the five types of structural change highlighted above 
require an integrated policy approach that links growth, job creation, skill development 
and technological change. A market-based approach that relies on the price mechanism 
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alone for resource allocation will not deliver this in the short or medium term. Neither 
will fiscal and monetary policy that strives only for stabilization.  
What is necessary is strategic and selective intervention by the state to pull and push 
productive resources into new employment generating sectors. And contrary to the 
orthodox belief, there is scope for the government to use macroeconomic policies for the 
strategic direction of productive resources. Such behaviour need not be distortionary or 
have negative growth and welfare effects as orthodoxy predicts. Indeed, as the 
experience of high performing economies (South Korea, China, India) has shown, 
developing countries do have a mix of macro policy instruments at hand which can be 
used to generate job-rich growth 
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Section three  
The macroeconomic policy environment in Malawi  
3.1 Malawi’s recent programme with the IMF  
Malawi reached a completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2006. This led to a relief 
of $646 million worth of debt (in net present value terms) under both HIPC and 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives (MDRI), as well as a topping up assistance worth 
$411 million in NPV terms. It is estimated that this would reduce the country’s annual 
debt service expenses to $5 million between 2006 and 2025, and increase average annual 
debt service savings from $39 million to $110 million within the same period (see 
Benson & Mangani, 2008).  
As a spill-over effect of the IMF decision, some donor countries also cancelled 
Malawi’s bilateral debt obligations. Importantly, reaching the HIPC completion point 
sent strong signals regarding macroeconomic management, and increased both the 
country’s sovereign credit rating and investor confidence. In addition, following a 
satisfactory final review of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
programme in July 2008, Malawi recently became the first recipient of a one-year  
US$77 million IMF Exogenous Shock Facility, (ESF) in the wake of high world prices 
for fertilizer and oil (CABS Group, 2009a). However, only US$52 million the total ESF 
value was actually paid out, and the programme was prematurely abandoned because the 
Government of Malawi could not meet some programme targets. A new three-year 
programme with the IMF was approved in February 2010. 
Malawi came through the global crisis with high growth rates but with a weak 
external position. The crisis led to a terms of trade shock in 2008 and, to a lesser extent, 
2009. The increase in fuel and fertilizer prices in 2008 resulted in an estimated 
deterioration in the balance of trade of about 7 per cent of GDP. The increase in 2008 
fertilizer prices alone was estimated to have contributed to an increase in import costs of 
almost 3 per cent of GDP, given the government's commitment to maintain the size of 
the input subsidy program in 2008 and expand it in 2009. 
While current account deficits in Malawi are persistent, the deterioration in 2008 
and 2009 was particularly severe. The current account deficit worsened from 1.6 per cent 
of GDP in 2007 to 6.4 per cent and 8.6 per cent in 2008 and 2009, respectively. This was 
driven in 2008 mainly by worsening terms of trade, while in 2009 this was partly the 
result of the spillover impact of higher prices from 2008 as well as a growing import bill 
and moderate growth in exports and net transfers.  
In the face of this, in 2008 Malawi became a recipient of US$77 million from the 
IMF’s Exogenous Shock Facility. Following the expiration of this program in December 
2009, the authorities negotiated a new medium-term macroeconomic program with the 
IMF.  
The stated objectives of the IMF programme are: 
1. Restoring external equilibrium by liberalizing the foreign exchange regime 
for current account transactions and by attaining foreign reserves to cover 
three months of imports 
2. To maintain internal equilibrium by prudent fiscal and monetary policies that 
contain aggregate demand and inflation  
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3. Sustaining poverty reduction by creating room in the budget for more pro-
poor spending and by creating safety nets to protect the poor from exogenous 
shocks 
4. Building competitiveness by encouraging public financial management, tax 
administration and the efficiency of public enterprises 
3.2 The Malawi growth and development strategy (MGDS) 
The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) is the overarching 
development strategy for Malawi for the five years from 2006/2007 to 2010/2011 fiscal 
years. The MGDS sets out development priorities and proposed outcomes and budgetary 
allocations. The overall goal of the MGDS is to transform the country from a 
predominantly consuming and importing country to a producing and exporting country 
The main thrust of the MGDS is to create wealth through sustainable economic 
growth and infrastructure development as a means of achieving poverty reduction. It 
presents a policy framework that articulates issues related to both economic growth and 
social development. The policy mix of the MGDS is aimed at achieving the medium-
term development objectives of sustainable economic growth and infrastructure 
development 
3.3 The MGDS and strategic interventions in the economy 
The MGDS emphasises six key priority areas. These are agriculture and food 
security; irrigation and water development; transport infrastructure development; energy 
generation and supply; integrated rural development; and prevention and management of 
nutrition disorders, HIV and AIDS. These six key priority areas are also expected to 
accelerate the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the areas of 
health, education, gender, environment, and governance. 
These six key priority areas have been selected from the broad MGDS framework 
of five thematic areas namely; sustainable economic growth; social protection; social 
development; infrastructure development and improving governance. 
The MGDS picks out specific sectors to promote. For instance in terms of rural 
development, it details the need to build a strong integrated cotton-textile sector which 
will promote rural incomes through backward and forward linkages. The potential for 
export earnings from this industry is also emphasized. 
In this sense the MGDS sets out a strategic interventions in the economy which are 
designed to generate growth-enhancing structural change.  
3.4 The MGDS and budget priorities  
In terms of budget prioritisation of the key target areas, transport infrastructure 
development takes the largest share of resources estimated at 54.1 per cent over the 
five years period. This is mainly a reflection of the high costs of proposed 
infrastructure projects, such as the development of the Shire Zambezi waterway. This 
is followed by agriculture and food security at 12.2 per cent. The combination of 
agriculture and food security, and irrigation and water development yields a total 
allocation of 21.0 per cent. This indicates recognition of the need to increase 
agricultural productivity.  
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The prevention and management of nutrition disorders, HIV and AIDS takes  
11.2 per cent of the resources. Integrated rural development and energy generation and 
supply are estimated to be allocated 10.1per cent and 3.6 per cent respectively. 
3.5 Limitations of the MGDS  
There are many commendable aspects to the MGDS. It identifies structural 
weaknesses in the economy and picks out strategic interventions to deal with them. 
However, several limitations of the MGDS can be noted. Most relevant for our analysis 
is the fact that the MGDS does not set any employment targets for its priority areas. 
Many officials who we interviewed for this study recognized this shortcoming. It is 
intended that the MGDS2, which is currently being prepared, will have more explicit 
consideration of employment.  
Further, while the MGDS, contains explicit elements of a selective industrial 
strategy – for instance by picking sectors such as the cotton-textile sector for  
promotion – there is limited discussion of specific measures that can be used to attract 
private investment into this sector. The role of public spending in building up such a 
sector is also not adequately addressed.  
In addition, while the MGDS sets out expenditure targets, it is based on the 
assumption that containing the fiscal deficit is central to stabilization. It does not 
therefore consider possibilities of expanding deficits in the medium term to increase state 
expenditure in the priority areas. 
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Section four  
Monetary policies for employment creation in Malawi  
4.1 The conduct of monetary policy in Malawi  
The conduct of monetary policy in Malawi since independence can be outlined in 
three broadly distinct monetary policy regimes –a) the period of financial repression 
(1964-86), b) the period of financial reforms (1987-1994) and c) the period of financial 
liberalisation (post-1994).  
Financial repression 1964-1986 
At independence in 1964, the formal banking system which the country adopted 
from the colonial government was perceived to be primarily interested in serving the 
needs of an expatriate community, to have little interest in direct lending to local 
entrepreneurs, and to impose unreasonably high charges on routine banking services 
(Gondwe, 2001). To get rid of these distortions, direct controls on credit and interest 
rates were imposed. The agricultural sector, in particular, was accorded preferential 
lending rates and quota credit allocations in line with government policy to promote 
agricultural production. A fixed exchange rate regime was also adopted and the limited 
price-controls on selected commodities which had been inherited at independence were 
extended to protect the internal terms of trade for rural relative to urban dwellers.  
In the late 1970s, a hostile external environment forced the economy into a deep 
recession, which persisted through the 1980s. Intensifications of civil war in 
neighbouring Mozambique, a consequent flooding of refugees into the country and 
disruption of a cost effective route to the sea ports of Beira and Nacala, the 1979 oil 
crisis and drought in 1980 were some of the factors that triggered the recession. In 
response, a phased financial liberalisation program targeted at enhancing competition and 
efficiency in the financial sector was adopted.  
Financial reforms 1987-1994 
The reforms commenced with partial deregulation of lending rates in July 1987 and 
deposit rates in April 1988. The partial deregulation allowed commercial banks to 
determine their own lending and deposit rates but not to effect any adjustment without 
prior consultation with the central bank. Credit ceilings were abolished in 1988. In 
January 1990, the authorities announced the abolition of preferential lending rates to the 
agricultural sector. Complete deregulation of the interest rates occurred in May 1990.  
The reform program also overhauled the legal and regulatory framework of the 
banking system, which involved revision of the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act of 1964 
and Banking Act of 1965 in May 1989 and December 1989, respectively. While the 
central bank was previously supervising commercial banks only, the revised Banking Act 
extended its coverage to include non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), a function that 
was previously in the hands of the Treasury. In addition, inspection of the financial 
institutions was broadened to include adherence to prudential requirements besides 
compliance to exchange control regulations. 
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Financial liberalisation –post 1994 
Malawi’s financial reforms reached near-completion with the floatation of the 
Malawi Kwacha on February 7, 1994. Subsequently, the monetary authorities removed 
exchange control regulations, allowed for the establishment of foreign exchange bureaux, 
introduced foreign currency denominated accounts, established a forward foreign 
exchange market and started the trading of foreign exchange options and currency swaps. 
Eight new commercial banks (one of which has since been liquidated) entered the 
commercial banking sector since 1994, changing the structure of the market from a 
duopoly to a fairly competitive sector. 
4.2 The Reserve Bank of Malawi – Monetary targets and instruments 
The Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) has been operational since 1965. The current 
enabling legislation of the RBM, the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act1989, stipulates the 
bank’s mandate in relation to monetary policy in very broad terms, as follows:  
…to implement measures designed to influence the money supply and the availability of 
credit, interest rates and exchange rates with the view to promoting economic growth, 
employment, stability in prices and sustainable balance of payments position.  
To operationalize these broad policy objectives in the short to medium term, the 
RBM proclaims the monetary policy objective of achieving low inflation and low interest 
rates, and sets an inflation target of 5 per cent by 2011. While the RBM clearly sets price 
stability as its measurable monetary policy objective in the short-term, it remains vague 
in terms of the uniqueness of its policy instrument, as is evident in the following 
pronouncement: 
In Malawi the objective of monetary policy is to bring inflation down to a single digit by 
2008. To achieve this, reserve money will remain the anchor of monetary policy. The Reserve 
Bank of Malawi uses a combination of instruments to achieve its objective on monetary 
policy. These include the bank rate, liquidity reserve requirements, open market operations, 
and sales and purchases of foreign exchange. 
While in recent years the key intermediate target of monetary policy has been the 
control of growth in broad money (M2), the operating procedure has focused on 
monitoring growth in reserve money (M0). This monitoring process is achieved through 
reserve money programming within the IMF’s monetary programming model for the 
country, which sets monthly and quarterly reserve money targets based on broad money 
targets thought to be consistent with the desired levels of economic growth and inflation 
(Kwalingana, 2007). Therefore, once an estimate of the commercial banks’ liquidity 
requirements is made, the procedure involves RBM’s intervention through changes in the 
amount of reserve money according to the stipulated liquidity reserve ratio (LRR), by 
manipulating commercial banks’ access to credit from the central bank. 
The present definition of the LRR is the ration of liquid assets (comprising cash, net 
balances with the RBM, Treasury Bills, exchange discounted and purchased payable in 
Malawi, Local Registered Stocks and transit items) to commercial banks’ liabilities to the 
public. (Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2010) 
4.3 Inflation trends in Malawi 
Malawi has experienced double-digit inflation for long periods since independence. 
Inflation worsened after the financial reforms of the late 1980s, averaging around  
25 per cent during 1995-2004 . After the interest rates were decontrolled in 1990 and the 
exchange rate was freed in 1994, there was severe upward pressure on prices. This was 
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largely due to the high cost of borrowing (the Bank rate increased to 50 per cent by 1995) 
and to the sharp rise in import costs following the depreciation of the kwacha in 1994. 
Annual inflation exceeded 60 per cent in 1995.  
Since 2004, however, there has been a drastic fall in inflation. In recent years 
inflation has remained moderate. After rising in late 2008, in response to food and fuel 
price shocks, consumer price inflation decreased steadily to 7.5 per cent in the 12 months 
to October 2009 (Table 9 and Figure 8).  
Table 9 Inflation rates 
Year Inflation Rate 
2005 15.4 
2006 13.9 
2007 8.0 
2008 8.7 
2009 7.5 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi –Financial and Economic Reviews 
 
Figure 8 Inflation in Malawi 
 
Source : Mangani (2009) 
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4.4 The causes of inflation in Malawi 
Several recent econometric studies have examined the relationship between the 
money supply and price levels in Malawi using vector autoregressive models (Mangani 
2009; Ngalawa 2009). These studies conclude that the conventional monetary theory of 
inflation, where an increase in money supply leads to an increase in price levels, does not 
hold in the case of Malawi. In fact periods with falling inflation (such as the current 
period) were associated with an increase in the money supply (Ngalawa 2009).  
In addition, these econometric studies show that while the lending rate 
instantaneously responded to bank rate adjustments and although the lending rate 
somewhat influenced money supply, the effects were hardly ever transmitted to prices. 
So the Keynesian interest rate view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism also 
does not apply to Malawi. Interest rates affect inflation via a cost of production effect 
rather than through money supply effects.  
These studies find that the exchange rate that has the most powerful effect on price 
levels in Malawi. Therefore the exchange rate between the Malawi kwacha and the US 
dollar appears to be the nominal anchor of stabilisation in economy. The strong influence 
of the exchange rate on consumer prices reflects the country’s high level of openness and 
import dependence (with imports amounting to 34 per cent of GDP) and a highly 
vulnerable foreign reserve situation due to a reliance on a narrow range of sources, most 
notably foreign aid and tobacco exports.  
The de facto peg of the Malawi Kwacha to the US dollar has been associated with 
the moderation of the inflation since 2006 but of course this has led to the appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate . In order to restore some external competitiveness and 
external reserve levels and conform with the IMF ECF programme this stance would 
have to be corrected, which could upset the inflation performance. This finding that the 
exchange rate is the most important variable in explaining prices is consistent with 
analytical results documented for Egypt (see Al-Mashat & Billmeier, 2007), Kenya 
(Rotich, Kathanje & Maana, 2007), and Ghana (Ocran, 2007). 
Aid flows finance about 40 per cent of total expenditure and unpredictability affects 
the inflation process through the need to borrow in order to finance expenditures whose 
budgeting was conditioned on the aid. The borrowing could lead to a rise in interest rates 
and cost-push inflation.  
4.5 Can monetary policy instruments be used to encourage Malawi onto a 
path of employment-generating growth?  
Monetary policy can be ‘ineffectual’ in the context of a low-income country with 
virtually no domestic bond market (McKinley 2010). Moreover, the types of structural 
change required in the Malawian economy to promote job-rich growth calls for a re-
channelling of resources from one sector to another, or from one industry to another. 
While macroeconomic policies (especially those that affect general liquidity levels) do 
not typically perform such a function, we have identified three policy areas for 
consideration. They are: 
1. Reducing Excess Liquidity of Commercial Banks 
2. Encouraging the Reserve Bank of Malawi to take on a Greater Developmental Role 
3.  Introducing interest rate flexibility which is tuned to seasonality in the agricultural 
sector in order to promote agricultural growth and job creation. 
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4.5.1 Reducing commercial bank excess liquidity to encourage employment-rich 
growth 
Malawian commercial banks have been characterised by systematically high levels 
of liquidity (Table 10). As Table shows the liquidity ratio of banks in 2009 was around 
35 per cent which is way above the required reserve ratio of between 15 and 20 per cent.  
High levels of commercial bank liquidity have important implications for the use of 
monetary policy for stimulating employment-rich growth. It indicates scope for 
channelling credit to productive sectors which need to expand for the economy to 
undergo structural change.  
Table 10 Commercial Banks Liquidity Ratios 
Year Liquidity Ratio 
2002 51.5 
2004 52.5 
2006 42.0 
2008 39.2 
2009 36.5 
 
Source: Computed from Reserve bank of Malawi Financial and Economic Review 2010 
 
Excess liquidity: The literature  
Excess liquidity is typically equated to the quantity of reserves deposited with the 
central bank by deposit money banks plus cash in vaults and other eligible liquid assets 
in excess of the required or statutory level. There is a large literature that notes the 
existence of excess liquidity among commercial banks in developing countries and 
investigates the reasons for this (Khemraj 2007).  
Excess liquidity may simply sometimes reflect the holding of liquidity for 
precautionary purposes. In other words, the accumulation of non-remunerated reserves 
may be a result of commercial banks optimizing behaviour. Agénor, Aizenman, and 
Hoffmaister (2004), for example, argue that the accumulation of reserves in excess of 
requirements in Thailand during the Asian crisis was a result of a supply-side 
consideration, contraction in the supply of credit by banks, and not due to a reduction in 
the demand for credit. Hence, their results suggest that the build-up of reserves in 
Thailand during the Asian crisis was not excessive in the sense that it exceeded 
commercial banks desired level of reserve holdings. 
Agénor, Aizenman, and Ho¤maister (2004) also highlight the role of increased 
uncertainty or risk of default or rising marginal cost of extending as a rationale for 
commercial banks’ excess liquidity. Institutional factors may also encourage commercial 
banks to hold precautionary reserves. Poorly developed interbank markets, for example, 
make it difficult for banks to borrow in order to cover contingencies. It has also been 
suggested that difficulties encountered by banks in tracking their position at the central 
bank may require them to hold reserves above the statutory limits. In addition, banks 
may want to hold precautionary excess reserves due to problems with the payments 
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system. Also, remote bank branches may need to hold excess reserves due to 
transportation problems. Finally, the importance of agricultural finance for commercial 
banks could make both the demand for credit and supply of deposits highly seasonal and 
not suitably synchronised. The resulting seasonal volatility of deposits and credit demand 
is likely to increase demand for excess liquidity during certain seasons to cover 
contingencies.  
However, not all excess liquidity may be voluntary. Some authors, for example 
Dollard and Hallward-Driemeier (1999) argue that, the build-up of excess liquidity in 
East-Asian countries during the crisis was a result of the reduction in the demand for 
credit, which itself was a result of the contraction in aggregate demand that accompanied 
the crisis.. 
If commercial banks hold more liquidity than they require, why do they not expand 
lending, buy government securities or reduce deposits?  
One possible explanation may be that economies are in a liquidity trap. In a 
standard liquidity trap where the rate of return on lending is too low to cover 
intermediation costs (and where bonds and reserves are perfect substitutes), banks have a 
higher yield on reserves than they do on loans. Hence, a monetary expansion by the 
central bank just leads to an increase in excess reserves, even beyond banks prudential 
requirements. 
In most Sub-Saharan African economies nominal interest rates are quite high and 
inconsistent with the presence of a liquidity trap. However, there may be impediments to 
the efficient functioning of financial markets that lead commercial banks to hold reserves 
in excess of that required for statutory and prudential purposes. In terms of the loan 
market, commercial banks may be (a) unable or (b) unwilling to expand lending to 
reduce involuntary reserves even if interest rates are positive. If governments are 
concerned about promoting financial deepening in the economy, they may therefore use 
moral suasion to make commercial banks accept deposits even where these lead to excess 
liquidity. 
Even if banks are able to expand lending, however, asymmetric information and 
lack of competition suggest that they may not be willing to do so. In SSA, the financial 
sector is often dominated by a few commercial banks that essentially act as an oligopoly 
provider of private sector loans and purchaser of government securities. Thus, the benefit 
of expanding lending at the margin, which is the same as the opportunity cost of 
involuntary excess reserves, may be much lower than the interest rate and sufficiently 
low for commercial banks to be willing to accumulate involuntary reserves even when 
the interest rate is positive. 
Also, even if commercial banks are unwilling to expand lending, one would still 
expect banks to reduce involuntary excess reserves by buying government bonds as these 
carry a higher yield than reserves. As commercial banks buy bonds, the spread between 
the return on bonds and reserves should fall until commercial banks are at a point of 
indifference where the prudential return on reserves equals the return on bonds. In this 
setting, involuntary excess reserves should only arise if bond yields went to zero so that 
the economy was in a liquidity trap. 
This should be the case even if the non-bank public does not hold bonds. If banks 
are the only holders of bonds, then the central bank can effectively control the amount of 
bonds held by the banking sector. However, in this case, competition for bonds among 
banks should ensure that bond rates eventually fall as bonds are rolled over until a point 
of indifference between reserves and bonds. Hence, the existence of involuntary excess 
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liquidity in equilibrium is inconsistent with the existence of a liquid and competitive 
bond market. 
In SSA, however, bond markets tend to be characterized by lack of competition 
between banks and a lack of a secondary market. Hence, there is no guarantee that the 
bond market will be able to perform the equilibrating role referred to above and thus 
enable commercial banks to run down involuntary excess liquidity.  
Excess Liquidity in Malawi 
There are 11 licensed commercial banks currently in Malawi with 19 per cent of the 
adult population banked (FinScope Malawi 2009). Total assets held by the banking 
system as of March 2009 was estimated at about US$1.28 billion, of which more than 65 
per cent is concentrated in the country’s three largest banks(Ministry of Finance, 2010, 
Financial Sector Development Strategy, 2010-2015). There is only a limited interbank 
market. 
Profitability among commercial banks in Malawi is very high. The average return 
on equity in the banking sector was estimated at 48 per cent at the end of 2008 (Malawi 
Financial Sector Development Strategy 2010). This level of profitability indicates that 
there is less pressure on commercial banks to diversify their client base and develop new 
markets for their financial services. As Table 8 on the sectoral composition of 
commercial bank lending showed, loans to the agricultural sector as a proportion of total 
loans has fallen over time. As noted in the Malawi Financial Sector Development 
Strategy 2010, this reflects banks intentionally reducing exposure to agricultural lending 
due to weak loan repayment. It appears that already high profitability levels have led 
banks to hold excess liquidity – they have few incentives to seek out new, more risky 
borrowers. 
In addition, recent financial reform linked to the IMF programme has meant that the 
Reserve Bank has moved out of the foreign exchange market as the intermediary 
between the public and commercial banks. Commercial banks now buy and sell foreign 
exchange directly from those who generate it. They derive around 25 per cent of their 
total income from foreign exchange markets, with the authorities effectively subsidising 
banks by supporting market mechanisms that maintain high spreads (Financial Sector 
Development Strategy 2010). 
The official spread is 2 per cent and Foreign Exchange Trading Guidelines do not 
allow banks to exceed the mid-rate when buying. Consequently banks have a spread of 
around 1 per cent which significantly boosts their profitability. This source of profits also 
allows banks to maintain high levels of liquidity but the direct access by commercial 
banks to tobacco proceeds has since been rescinded in February 2011. 
Monetary policy recommendation one – Use a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to reducing 
bank liquidity 
In the present economic reality, it is unlikely that commercial banks in Malawi will 
increase productive lending and change the risk/return trade-off that exists. Positive 
incentives to reduce liquidity or disincentives to maintain high liquidity are required.  
We suggest the Reserve Bank takes an inventive approach to this issue and reduces 
liquidity in a way that could generate job-rich growth. We propose the following two 
options. 
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The Carrot 
The Reserve Bank could link commercial bank reserve requirements to lending for 
priority sectors. Hence it would allow a proportion of their lending, say 0.1 per cent, to 
these sectors to qualify as banks’ eligible reserves. This therefore involves a strategic 
direction of credit by the state by using the ‘carrot’ of the reserve ratio as a policy 
instrument.  
What are these priority sectors?  
As we discussed in Section…priority sectors are those with strong backward and 
forward linkages that have potential for enhanced employment generation. For example, 
the MGDS emphasises the transformation of the economy to a producing (value-adding) 
and exporting one. The ‘Integrated Cotton and Textile Sector’ is given specific mention 
but this could apply to all manufacturing and exporting activities which should indeed be 
key priority for directed commercial bank lending. Tourism is another sector that will 
benefit from priority lending. Malawi has potential for reaching into the higher value end 
of the tourist market (for instance, aiming at joint Zambia/Malawi travel) but this 
requires capital investment.  
In addition, wholesale lending to microfinance institutions can ease credit 
constraints for micro enterprises. This can go some way in helping these enterprises 
graduate into small medium-sized firms, thus addressing the issue of ‘the missing 
middle’ we identified in Section 3. This would come under sub-theme 1.2, “Enabling 
environment for business” and is addressed under the new, dedicated Financial Sector 
Development Strategy, 2010–2015.  
The Stick 
An ‘excess liquidity tax’ could be used as a ‘stick’ to discourage commercial banks 
from inefficient hoarding of cash. In other words, commercial banks could be disciplined 
if liquidity levels are higher than the Reserve Banks stipulated ratio. An alternative way 
viewing this can be as an inverse standing facility (short-term high-interest lending). 
Commercial banks have been at liberty in introducing “new products”, which have 
included charges for making deposits (use of banking halls), charges on current account 
balances and pushing costs of faulty or malfunctioning software to customers. Also, from 
a policy design perspective it can be argued that this instruments is price-based and non-
coercive.  
Malawi is currently is moving towards a loan guarantee system through the 
establishment of a Credit Reference Bureau and National Identity system. This should 
ease the risk averseness of commercial bank to lend. With these institutional 
arrangements in place the Reserve Bank will be in a better position to use carrot and stick 
instruments to reduce excess bank liquidity in a way that promotes growth and 
employment creation.   
4.5.2 Monetary policy recommendation two – A greater developmental role for the 
reserve bank of Malawi  
The IMF expects progress in monetary policy to be reflected by a shift from direct 
instruments towards indirect money market operations which for developing countries is 
limited by underdeveloped capital markets. However, for structural transformation that 
boosts employment-creating growth this would not be enough. There is a need for 
discretionary measures with a stronger allocative stance. Epstein (Feb., 2009) building on 
the works of others shows that historically present day developed countries and those that 
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have registered recent success such as India and China were beneficiaries of central 
banks that played a developmental role.  
In Malawi the Reserve Bank can play a role in mobilising resources for micro-
finance institutions (MFIs), small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and key sectors such 
as manufacturing and exports capable of transforming economies, generating value 
addition, employment, incomes and export potential. 
Loan guarantee programmes can be used for this end. These would guarantee a 
proportion of commercial banks loans to other financial institutions that have the 
experience to on-lend to SMEs which create decent jobs and other positive effects. The 
guarantees lower commercial bank risk, the need for collateral and also the final interest 
rate charges (or raise the risk-weighted price for the commercial banks). 
Loan guarantee programmes are not monetary policy instruments but can achieve 
allocative outcomes while the narrow focus on inflation and deficits of IMF programmes 
has itself has been considered not to be development oriented and irrelevant for 
developing country needs (UNCTAD, 21 June, 2010). The Reserve Bank is mandated to 
improve the availability of credit and supporting private-sector-led structural change and 
economic growth. Moreover, the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy  
(1996–2011) and all the IMF programmes for more than a decade and including the 
current ECF have required policies that have a strong focus on poverty reduction, 
Currently the RBM oversees the development and articulation of the financial sector with 
the rest of the economy to improve the Government’s ability to conduct macroeconomic 
policy through improved transmission channels. A host of bills have been prepared and 
some already passed by Parliament. These, include the Financial Services Bill, Banking 
Bill, Insurance Bill, Microfinance Bill, Credit Referencing Bureau Bill, the Financial 
Cooperatives Bill, the Reserve Bank of Malawi Bill, the Retirement Funds Bill, the 
Companies Bill, the Bankruptcy Bill and the Payments, Clearing and Settlement Bill. In 
addition a first stage Financial Sector Development Strategy 2010–2015 has been 
prepared.  
4.5.3 Monetary policy recommendation three – Adjust interest rates to take account 
of seasonality in agriculture 
While interest rates have been falling in recent years, Malawi’s real lending rates 
are in the order of 15 per cent which is by far one of the highest in the world. Interest rate 
spreads at around 20 per cent- are also the highest in the region though decreasing slowly  
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Figure 9. Real Lending Interest Rates and Nominal Spread in sub-Saharan Africa  
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In Malawi, use of the monetary instrument of the interest rate to promote job-
rich growth calls for a rethinking of the directional relationship between inflation 
and the rate of interest.  
This rationale for this recommendation can be elaborated as follows.  
This paper calls for a delinking of the exiting directional relationship between 
inflation and interest rate changes. As a poor country food prices contribute highly to the 
national consumer price index in Malawi, an estimated 55 per cent (World Bank, 2004). 
Since maize, the main component of food for the majority is grown mainly on a 
subsistence basis and under uni-modal rain-fed conditions, in typical years its supply is 
limited and its price on the market display seasonality patterns. The price of maize tends 
to rise around the time when farmers are preparing for the next season’s crop. Rising 
interest rates at this time deters investment and constrains future supply and pushes up 
prices in the longer term. Current policy thinking does not allow for falling interest rates 
at a time of rising prices. However, we suggest that it is important to recognise the 
seasonality of price movements and create flexibility in short-term interest rate 
movements. This argument extends to the whole agriculture sector including export and 
other cash crops whose supply needs to be strengthened for rural incomes and domestic 
value addition such as the integrated cotton and textile sector.    
Interest rate manoeuvres of this sort are contingent on several factors. One, the 
willingness of commercial banks to lend (and the effectiveness of our proposed policies 
to deal with this). Two, the creation on new lending sources such as micro-finance 
institutions which are still in their infancy in Malawi. Such institutions should be 
encouraged to understand the seasonality of the demand for rural credit and manipulate 
interest rates accordingly.  
Seasonality and Monetary Policy 
Figure 10 below sets out Malawi’s seasonality timeline and its links to rain-fed 
agriculture activity for food and cash crops as well as consumption. Among the major 
cash crops, sugar is the main one grown under irrigation and its seasonality cycle differs 
from that of rain-fed crops because of water-management and conditions required for 
harvesting. Food and particularly maize production and availability have implications for 
inter-seasonal price patterns and food and headline inflation. Production of other main 
non-irrigated cash crops, presently tobacco and cotton exports have implications for the 
current account, where the exports are also seasonal. Harvests of rain-fed crops are 
delivered after the rainy season which lasts between October and May.    
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Figure 10 Malawi Agriculture Seasonality Timeline  
 
Source: USAID, Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) 
In Malawi the growing of maize is under rain-fed conditions. Apart from 
exceptionally good harvest years, the seasonal patterns of price are similar and reflect 
relative scarcity the further away from harvest. 
The Food Price-Inflation Nexus 
Table 11 presents Malawi’s food costs and the All-items Consumer Price Index 
aligned to start at the end of the harvest season, which during August for the three-year 
period 20005-2007. Figure 11 shows, visually a high degree of correlation in all the 
series indicating that the seasonality and the food price-CPI link is fairly stable across 
years . The food price-CPI correlation coefficients for the three years, 2005, 2006 and 
2007 are respectively, 0.849, 0.923 and 0.955. 
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Table 11 Malawi: Seasonal Food Costs and the All Items CPI 
 All Items CPI Food Costs 
Month All2005 All2006 All2007 F2005 F2006 F2007 
Aug 189.0 184.2 227.1 165.1 211.8 196.3 
Sept 200.1 199.0 239.3 176.3 223.5 212.3 
Oct 202.5 200.9 241.0 179.6 224.7 214.0 
Nov 209.1 210.3 248.0 188.9 230.9 224.3 
Dec 214.8 218.3 254.0 197.4 236.6 232.9 
Jan 194.1 216.4 248.4 183.5 226.6 237.4 
Feb 200.4 228.7 256.0 190.7 234.5 249.4 
Mar 201.0 227.7 254.6 191.1 234.4 246.5 
April 198.0 220.0 249.2 185.7 229.9 237.3 
May 195.0 211.8 243.7 179.3 225.8 227.0 
Jun 189.3 198.3 234.9 168.7 218.2 211.8 
Jul 188.4 193.7 232.6 165.3 216.6 206.6 
 
Source: National Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook, 2010. 
 
Figure 11 Malawi Food Costs/CPI Seasonality and Correlation 
 
Source: FAO 2010 
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Implications of Seasonality for the Conduct of Monetary Policy 
Legislatively monetary policy in Malawi, in the area of interest rate setting, is a 
mandate of the central bank. But institutionally and operationally the central bank has 
had as much autonomy as the authorities who determine Treasury Bill and other yields as 
well as the necessity for IMF programme allows it, which is none.  
Under the IMF’s Article VIII the common understanding by both the IMF and the 
demand side, the Ministry of Finance is that interest rates benchmarked on the bank rate 
cannot, even and especially in the short-term, be seen to be going in the opposite 
direction as that the inflation rates: in fact the IMF’s position has been that if the basis of 
bank rate reduction is a fall in the inflation rate the opposite should also apply. When 
Treasury Bill yields are not in contention, as has been the case recently, the bank rate 
reductions can only be contemplated from about March to July. The seasonality issue 
related to rain-fed agriculture means that the barometric bank rate should actually be 
rising thereafter during the season when all other farmers apart from irrigation 
production are preparing for the next growing season in terms of borrowing between 
August and September of each year.  
The implied (short-term) seasonality in the cost of borrowing which affects the 
levels of practically all output including food and cash crops (for domestic value addition 
and exports) as well as food prices and export earnings is in this context seasonally pro-
cyclical and locally (domestically) destabilising. The link does not lend itself to 
supporting domestic livelihoods, including the sustenance of employment and 
consumption. 
The foregoing is an observation which is generalizable beyond the Malawian 
context and applies to similarly placed economies with high dependence on the 
agriculture sector and nature for agricultural production. Recently, Malawi has been able 
to reduce the bank rate at the back of the agricultural input programme and favourable 
rains which have brought food prices and the inflation rate down to single-digit levels for 
a prolonged period of time.   
In the light of the above discussion this study recommends that a wide band of 
interest rates are used strategically to incentivise seasonal operation decisions and 
to promote long-term crop diversification.  
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Section five  
Fiscal policy and employment growth 
5.1 Trends in fiscal performance 
Fiscal policy in Malawi over the last 5 years has emphasised the need to shrink 
deficits.  
The IMF programme in Malawi calls for fiscal tightening, with a floor on social 
spending. The government has therefore committed to cut lower priority expenditures 
while protecting social expenditures while fiscal deficits ranged between 6 per cent and 
11 per cent of GDP in the period 1995–2004, they have declined thereafter. The deficit 
was 5.8 per cent of GDP in 2008/2009 and 4.2 per cent in 2009/2010 (Figure 12 . The 
loosening of fiscal policy early 2009 was the result of sizeable budget overruns on 
fertilizer and general expenditures in goods and services. The overrun on fertilizer 
expenditures reflected in part high prices in international markets.  
Domestic debt in Malawi rose sharply between 2000 and 2004 (reaching 20 per cent 
of GDP in 2004) but has been falling since (Figure 13).  
Figure 12. Revenue, grants and deficits as a percentage of GDP 
Figure 1a: Fiscal Deficit (after grants) as % of GDP
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Source: African Development Bank (2009) 
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Figure 13. Domestic debt 
Figure 2a: Domestic Debt as % of GDP
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Source: African Development Bank (2009) 
 
a) Falling development expenditure 
Development expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure has fallen over time. 
While development expenditure accounted for 41 per cent of total expenditure in 2006, it 
had fallen to 26.5 by 2010 (Table 12). This partly reflects increased social sector 
expenditure, in particular the wage costs in education and health. The decline in 
Development Expenditure also reflects increased outlays on the input subsidy for maize.  
Table 12 Recurrent and development expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure 
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/2010  
Recurrent 
expenditure 
58.6 58.4 77.0 74.0  
Development 
expenditure 
41.4 41.8 23.7 26.5  
 
Source: Computed from Reserve bank of Malawi Financial and Economic Review 2010 
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b) The challenges of protecting social sector expenditure  
Gains have been made in social sector expenditure and these need to be protected. 
However, problems remain. The education sector faces a financing gap of over US$200 
million to implement its education sector plan over the three years, the 2009/10 budget 
has been reduced from 4.3 per cent of GDP to 4.2 per cent. 
Similarly, allocation to the health sector has been cut from 6.2 per cent of GDP to 
4.8 per cent. Government has sought to minimize the negative impact of these spending 
cuts to high priority social sectors. For instance, the 2009/10 revised budget has 
increased Nutrition and HIV/AIDS spending by 0.24 per cent of GDP to offset some of 
the cuts in the original budget. 
c) The maize input subsidy  
The main plank of social sector spending is the input subsidy program (Figure 7). 
Expenditure on fertilizers amounts to 80 per cent of the combined expenditures on 
education and health. Until 2009, the cost of the program was rapidly increasing. When it 
started in 2005/06, the program cost just $70 million, or 1.7 per cent of GDP. However 
during the 2008/09 agricultural season, the program cost rose to $279 million or 5.8 per 
cent of GDP, partly as a result of the sharp increase in world fertilizer prices. As this 
level of spending on the programme was not sustainable, the Government's response was 
to re-target the program towards maize production in 2009/10.  
Figure 14  The importance of maize in public expenditure 
Figure 3a: Breakdown of Domestic Expenditure (%)
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Source: African Development Bank (2009) 
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d) Aid dependency of the budget 
Malawi’s budget relies heavily on foreign aid. In the 2009/10 budget, aid accounted 
for 33 per cent of the total financing. Grants as a proportion of GDP have been steadily 
declining as domestic revenue performance has strengthened overtime. As a share of 
GDP, grants are estimated at 11.4 per cent in 2009/10, a slight decline from 11.7 per cent 
in 2008. This decline from 2008/09 is attributed to budget support disbursement delays 
over macroeconomic and fiscal concerns. Direct budget support in fiscal year 2009/10 
represents 25 per cent of all grant inflows and 9 per cent of the total budget. 
Predictability remains an issue as most budget support donors tie their support to 
government’s performance on the IMF-monitored programme. Government partially 
attributes domestic debt increases to unpredictability of budget support disbursements. 
Importantly 80 per cent of the annual development budget is financed by foreign 
grants and loans. 
As Figure 15 shows aid disbursements have broadly been in line with the Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy priorities. 
Figure 15 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 2010 
 
e) Restructuring loss making of parastatals  
The Malawi government has taken steps to privatize some parastatals – including the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), ESCOM (electricity) and 
the Water Boards. The process has, however, stalled due to concerns about the social welfare 
role of these parastatals. Public private partnerships have now been emphasized as a way of 
moving forward the privatisation agenda and improving efficiency of public enterprises. The 
Privatisation Commission is being transformed into Public Private Partnership (PPP) Unit.  
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f) Improvements in revenue mobilisation  
Tax revenue mobilisation improved in the past five years, averaging 17 per cent of 
GDP.. The establishment of the semi-autonomous Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) in 
1998 has helped to expand the tax base and improve compliance. The MRA Act is the 
overall legal framework for revenue collection in Malawi. The Taxation Act provides for 
collection of income tax which includes Pay As You Earn (PAYE) and related fringe 
benefits. The VAT Act and the Customs and Excise Act provide the legal framework for 
the collection of VAT and various trade taxes respectively. Work to review the Tax Code 
of 1971 is under way with 2010 as a target date for approval 
In 2009 2516 new tax payers were registered. At MWK 75.36 billion, the total tax 
revenue in the 2008/09 tax year represented a 32 per cent increase over the 2007/08 
level.  
As a proportion of total revenues, tax revenues have increased from 53 per cent in 
2005/06 to 60 per cent in 2008/98 while non-tax revenues have declined from 47 per cent 
to 40 during the same period.  
Indirect taxes contribute the most to total government tax revenues. In the 2008/09 
tax year, 47 per cent of the total tax revenue came from indirect taxes with direct taxes 
and import duties contributing 37 per cent and 11 per cent respectively..  
The VAT and corporate tax rates stand at 16.5 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. 
Tax rates for individuals are on a graduated basis, the first MWK 120 000 being taxed at 
0per cent, the next MWK 36 000 at 15 per cent and anything above that, at 30 per cent. 
There is a 10 per cent withholding tax on dividends as well as a 15 per cent income tax 
on non-residents who were originally from Malawi. The law provides for various degrees 
of tax exemptions to the presidency, government ministers, parliamentarians, members of 
the diplomatic corps and donor-funded programmes.  
5.2  Fiscal policy options for employment-boosting growth  
5.2.1  Focusing on the structure of fiscal deficits 
The orthodox approach to fiscal policy focuses mainly on its magnitude, and aims 
to keep this magnitude within non-inflationary levels. The structure of the fiscal deficit is 
examined mainly to identify wasteful expenditures that can be eliminated for fiscal 
prudence. 
This paper argues that the structure of the fiscal deficit can have a significant impact 
on employment-generating growth. We focus in particular on the economic/social sector 
divide in government spending. 
The 2006 Public Expenditure Review for Malawi posited two alternative 
expenditure strategies which were seen to generate varying results. On the one hand, a 
strategy that focuses on increased spending on economic sectors was seen as leading 
primarily to higher growth and its effect on poverty reduction was claimed to be less 
significant. On the other hand a strategy that increased social sector spending was seen as 
having a larger, more direct positive impact on poverty reduction. 
Our report calls for new thinking on this social/economic divide in state spending. 
While indeed we agree that social expenditure is crucial for reducing many aspects of 
poverty – especially non-income aspects – the ways in which spending on economic 
sectors impact upon poverty and employment require further analysis. Strategic and 
efficient expenditures by the state in economic sectors can bring about a sustained 
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reduction in poverty than comes about through the poor gaining access to regular, paid 
work.  
We highlight several fiscal policy options for boosting job-creating growth in 
Malawi. 
5.2.2. Fiscal policy recommendation one – Target fiscal policy to boosting priority 
sectors  
Expenditure on priority economic sectors that enable structural change and 
diversification should increase if Malawi is to embark on a path of job-rich growth. 
As noted in Section Four, export-oriented and vertically integrated sectors such as 
cotton and textiles should be developed in Malawi. This sector should be targeted by 
appropriate expenditure and tax incentives. Tourism is another sector that should be 
targeted.  
5.2.3 Fiscal policy recommendation two - Facilitate increased private investment 
through fiscal incentives and by complementary public investments that ‘crowd in’ 
private investment.  
State investment in priority sectors should aim at facilitating increased private 
sector participation. There are some areas of economic infrastructure provision into 
which the private sector can be encouraged to enter, for instance private-public 
partnerships could be considered in electricity generation. The government needs to 
provide fiscal incentives for this and to regulate the private sector (in particular through 
competition policy ) so that the objective of easing this infrastructure constraint is met. 
5.2.4 Fiscal policy recommendation three – Increase public expenditure on skill 
development 
Skill development should be a focus on government expenditure. This is an area 
where private sector involvement is likely to be unsuitable for meeting national 
objectives. In particular, the ‘missing middle’ of skills in Malawi should be targeted. 
Skill development should be closely integrated into overall policy for structural change 
and diversification. Hence expenditure should focus on skills needed by priority sectors. 
Again, the integrated cotton-textile industry should be targeted.  
There should be a re-alignment of public expenditure away from tertiary education 
and into the vocational and technical sector (TVET). A primarily state financed training 
institute for the clothing industry (with tax incentives to encourage private sector 
participation) , would fill a large skill gap in this priority sector.   
5.2.5 Fiscal policy recommendation four – Design an exit strategy from the maize 
subsidy and increase public investment in irrigation 
It is time to also think of an exit strategy from expenditure on maize. This has to be 
gradual and sequential, for instance by a gradual reduction of the subsidy for maize and 
an increase in subsidy for other cash crops. Our recommendation of an exit strategy from 
maize does not have the objective of deficit reduction. Instead, we see this as part of an 
overall strategy to improve diversification within agriculture so that the sector grows in a 
way that generates a significant increase in decent jobs and in incomes.  
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Give high levels of rural poverty, investment in irrigation remains beyond the reach 
of poor farmers. ‘Irrigation and Water Development’ is a priority of the MGDS and  
21 per cent of MGDS expenditure is allocated to the food security, agriculture and 
irrigation sector. However, high expenditure on maize input subsidies constrains public 
irrigation investment. A gradual exit strategy from maize can release funds that should be 
directed towards irrigation.  
5.2.6 Fiscal policy recommendation five – Increase the efficiency of public 
expenditure 
Boosting employment-rich growth also requires improving the efficiency of public 
expenditure. The 2006 Public Expenditure Review notes that the efficiency of education 
expenditure is low. Efficiency gains are crucial if Malawi is to reach the goal of universal 
primary education by 2015. Reaching this goal requires a 40 per cent increase in 
recurrent expenditure in education.  
As noted above, the Malawi government is also taking steps to establish public-
private partnerships when restructuring loss making parastatals. It is important that 
reducing fiscal losses is not the only guiding objective of this process. In particular, 
improving service delivery, especially in key areas such as electricity, must be integral to 
this restructure process.  
5.2.7 Fiscal policy recommendation six - Improve Revenue Mobilisation 
As we noted earlier several recent steps have been taken to enhance tax revenue 
mobilisation. The Malawi Revenue Authority was established to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of tax revenue mobilisation. In 2006 the authorities removed the 
Minister of Finance’s discretionary powers to waive duty – considered non-transparent 
and prone to abuse. The authorities further abolished the cumbersome and costly pre-
shipment inspection, and replaced it with the post-clearance auditing function in 2009. 
Latest reforms include extending VAT in 2004 to manufacturing, wholesale and retail to 
expand the tax base.  
Still, challenges remain to further increase revenue mobilisation.  
About 70per cent of Malawians are smallholder subsistence farmers whose annual 
earnings cannot easily be assessed, captured and taxed. The informal sector is large, 
estimated at about 70per cent of the urban labour force. The majority of operators in the 
agriculture and informal sectors are self-employed. Operating mostly on cash-based 
transactions, taxpayer registration and compliance in the informal sector are problematic. 
MRA also observes that some formal sector entities operate in the informal sector 
through third parties to avoid tax. It is necessary therefore to better target the informal 
sector in revenue mobilisation efforts.  
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Section six 
External sector policies and employment creation 
6.1 The external sector in Malawi 
Section Two showed that Malawi has a weak external sector characterised by 
narrowly concentrated primary commodity exports and a high level of import 
dependence. Due to a strong kwacha, import growth at 5.04 per cent has outpaced the 
growth in exports. Extension of high-priced fertiliser contracts and extra budgetary 
imports contributed to the high import bill. Nevertheless, the trade balance has continued 
to improve from -10.1 per cent of GDP in 2008 to -8.8 per cent in 2009. Foreign Direct 
Investment fell from USD 215 million in 2008 to USD 110 million in 2009. 
Consequently, the current account deficit has expanded from -6.8 per cent of GDP in 
2008 to -8.1 per cent.  
6.1.1 Exchange Rate Policy  
Various exchange rate regimes have been pursued in Malawi during its history.  
The Malawi kwacha (MK) was pegged to the British pound sterling (GBP) at one-
to-one between 1964, and at MK2.00 = GBP1.00 between 1967 and 1973. Following the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods’ fixed exchange rate system, the kwacha was pegged to a 
trade-weighted average of the pound sterling and US dollar between November 1973 and 
June 1975, and to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) at almost one-to-one between July 
1975 and January 1984. In response to an expansion in Malawi’s trade volume and 
trading partners, the kwacha was eventually pegged to a trade-weighted basket of seven 
currencies. This period was characterised by frequent devaluations of the kwacha, 
implemented in the context of the IMF’s SAPs, in an attempt to improve the country’s 
export competitiveness and BOP position. Devaluations of 10 per cent, 20 per cent,  
7 per cent, 15 per cent, and 22 per cent were effected in 1986, 1987, 1988, March 1990, 
March 1992 and August 1992, respectively.  
In February 1994, the kwacha was finally floated, and an interbank foreign 
exchange market was introduced to determine the exchange rate through market forces. 
The current account was effectively liberalised consequently, although the capital 
account remains un-liberalised and some exchange controls (e.g., limitations on foreign 
exchange allowances for travel, remittances, repatriations and importation of consumer 
goods) remain in place. The immediate effect of the flotation was a 220.9 per cent 
depreciation of the domestic currency by December 1994 (Kayira, 2006) 
To operationalize the flexible regime, an auctioning system was introduced at the 
time of currency floatation, allowing the highest bidder to purchase the available foreign 
exchange from the RBM. This system was, however, abandoned within 1994. Instead, 
the government adopted a managed floating system in 1995, under which the authorities 
intervened to artificially influence the exchange rate through sales and purchases of 
foreign currency, hence managing it within a limited band. However, the band was 
removed later in 1998 in favour of a free float, only to be reinstated in mid-2004. 
From May 2006, the government of Malawi pursued a fixed pegged exchange rate 
policy, holding the nominal value of the Malawi Kwacha steady at MWK 141:1 USD up 
to October 2009. The authorities used the exchange rate as an anchor to stabilise the 
price of imports. The strong kwacha however meant that imports became implicitly 
cheap while the real kwacha price of tobacco stagnated. A fixed peg against the US 
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dollar resulted in a sharp appreciation of the real and nominal effective exchange rate on 
the back of the strengthening of the US dollar in the first half of the year. This meant 
other currencies such as the British Pound (GBP) and the Euro (EUR) weakened against 
the dollar, leading to an implicit appreciation of the MWK.  
The government of Malawi has moved to address the problem of foreign exchange 
shortages and low reserves by adopting a more flexible exchange rate. In October 2009, 
they introduced a flexible exchange rate for the MWK against the USD with the 
objective of creating a better balance between supply and demand of foreign exchange.  
6.1.2 The Present Overvaluation of the Malawi Kwacha 
The sharp devaluation of most global currencies against the dollar since August 
2008 has resulted in a very significant appreciation of the Malawian kwacha against its 
main trading counterparts. 
The Malawi government has resisted devaluation, viewing a viewed a depreciating 
currency as being perceived by their detractors as a sign of failure in economic 
management. So the Kwacha has been kept overvalued with the preference being to 
allocate foreign reserves administratively. Shortages of foreign reserves have been 
blamed on transfer pricing in sectors such as tobacco and on the smuggling of foreign 
currency.  
Exchange rate liberalisation is a main theme of the IMF program and the 
disadvantages of an overvalued currency are emphasised by the Fund.  
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi 2010 
6.1.3 The Role of the Real Exchange Rate in Economic Growth in Malawi 
Many commentators have noted the role played by exchange rates in the Malawian 
economy, both as an anchor of stabilisation and in promoting growth (Mangani 2010).  
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The importance of exports expressed in real kwacha rather than real dollars 
highlights the importance of the real exchange rate in Malawi’s growth story (Lea and 
Hanmer 2009). Thus a devaluation of the real exchange rate increases the real domestic 
value of exports relative to the real dollar value. To illustrate quite how important this 
variable has been for growth, Figure 10 plots per capita exports in both real dollars and 
real kwacha. 
 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi 2010  
The two series track each other reasonably well until 1994 when kwacha exports 
sharply depart from the dollar series. The improvement is due to a steady depreciation of 
the real exchange rate – shown on the graph by the rise in its reciprocal. This 
depreciation has increased the real kwacha value of exports by about 2.5 times since the 
exchange rate levels of the 1970s. Because GDP is highly sensitive to export revenues in 
real kwacha, this management of the exchange rate is very likely to have had a large 
beneficial effect on incomes, and more than any other policy instrument, enabled Malawi 
to grow in a hostile terms-of-trade environment. 
The data also implies that prior to liberalization in 1994, the formal exchange rate 
was greatly overvalued, and Malawi could only have experienced such high growth in 
the seventies due to exceptionally favourable export prices. It is also clear that although 
the long-term trend has been positive, the management of the rate has been volatile. 
Sharp step devaluations have rapidly transmitted into domestic prices causing the real 
exchange rate to depreciate and then re-appreciate, and this instability is likely to have 
disrupted growth by increasing uncertainty in real export prices. Partly as a result of this, 
the government has used the nominal exchange rate as a stabilization instrument, 
implementing a slow crawling peg to the US dollar since 2006. 
Overvaluation has resulted in an import boom. Imports have doubled over the last 
five years in nominal dollar terms (NSO). How was such an import boom financed? 
Principally it was through the foreign exchange generated by exports and aid. The 
depletion of foreign exchange reserves has also contributed falling to 1.3 months of 
import cover by the end of 2008.  
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The rise in imports since 2004 has been accompanied by a change in composition 
skewed towards consumption. In real dollar terms consumption imports have increased 
by 86 per cent, intermediate imports by 50 per cent (mainly on account of fuel and 
fertilizer) and investment imports by only 29 per cent.  
Further, consumption demand which has not created a response from domestic 
industry. Taken together with the trade deficit and run down of reserves, this emphasizes 
again that the exchange rate remains overvalued.  
6.2 External sector policies for employment generation 
6.2.1. External sector recommendation one – This report argues for a devaluation of 
the Malawi Kwacha.  
Devaluation is necessary to ease the current very serious foreign exchange shortage 
which disrupts supplies of imported inputs and stalls production and also raises import 
costs due to interest charges by foreign suppliers and buyers. This foreign exchange 
constraint needs to be eased as part of a macroeconomic policy package aimed at 
creating employment-rich growth. 
We recognise that devaluation will hugely increase government expenditure on the 
maize subsidy as fertiliser is imported. In the short- term this will reduce fiscal space. To 
deal with this to some extent at least, there is an urgent need to enhance domestic tax 
mobilisation efforts as discussed above. In addition, as mentioned earlier policy debate in 
Malawi need to consider an exit strategy from the maize subsidy.  
By changing the relative prices between tradeables and non-tradeables devaluation 
can encourage expenditure switching into the non-tradeable sector (e.g. domestic input 
production) which can promote export competitiveness and diversification in the medium 
term. If sectors such as an export oriented integrated cotton-textile industry is to take off 
in Malawi, it is important that a competitive exchange rate be maintained. A competitive 
exchange rate should be part of a policy package that targets structural change in the 
economy and generates employment-enhancing growth.  
It is also necessary to develop the supply side to respond future exchange rate 
movements. Exchange rate movements require a domestic response capacity if they are 
to boost employment-rich growth. Currently, it is unlikely that the domestic private 
sector in Malawi will respond quickly to the change in relative prices arising from 
devaluation by investing in production for import substitution or export. A combination 
of industrial policies directed at specific sectors such as textiles, apparel and agribusiness 
in required for this. While the MGDS identify the need for this, a range of policy 
measures to encourage and enable private investment into these sectors needs to be 
worked out.  
6.2.2 External sector recommendation two – Increase competitiveness of the export 
sector 
We have shown earlier that Malawi’s exports are very limited in scope although 
there has been some improvement during the past decade (2000–2009). The degree of 
export diversification is very low. Increasing the labour absorption capacity of the 
Malawian economy call for growth and structural change in the export sector.  
Devaluation will help boost export competitiveness in the short run, to a certain 
extent.  
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There is also the need to diversify the export bases by increasing the number of 
products. This would broaden the front for domestic economic integration through value 
addition and import-substitution. This in turn would reduce the high import-dependence 
as well as raise the profile of non-traditional exports for broader-based and stable export 
earnings from products with higher income elasticity of demand. These require a suitable 
relative incentive environment that favours or at least one which is not tilted against the 
tradables sectors or activities. The speed and quality of Malawi’s effective responses to 
the incentive environment will be determined by supply-side constraints but in some 
instances the demand side also needs to be effectively managed through trade relations.  
Export responses from the primary, plantation-based products will likely be locked 
into long gestation periods as will that requiring domestic value-addition to seasonal 
crops like cotton which depends on domestic linkage capacity.    
Below we identify some markets in which export opportunities have not been 
fully exploited.  
a) Duty free access to developed country markets 
Under the United States government’s African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) Malawi was a beneficiary of preferential duty and quota free access to the US 
market for 1,800 product lines. Owing to poor economic and export diversification the 
economy has only been able to benefit in terms of only two product lines, namely textiles 
and apparel and macadamia nuts, which in any case are minor exports. Moreover for the 
textiles and apparel market access was higher in the earlier years (2000-2005) and have 
since dropped after the expiry of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) which had protected 
Malawi and other African bigger South Asian exporters. 
Under the European Union’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, Malawi has 
befitted in the form of higher sugar prices than the world prices, despite quotas applying. 
But this arrangement is short-lived and scheduled to end in 2015. Yet sugar exports by 
one firm, Illovo, are easily the second largest export product with Illovo being the largest 
firm in the economy in terms of turnover, employment and contribution to tax revenue. 
b) Trade agreements within southern Africa 
Another trade arrangement where Malawi could have under-performed is in the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) with a scheduled but missed eventual 
progression to a Customs Union in 2010.  
This had negative implications for the textile and apparel sector with Malawi losing 
out in terms of domestic economic integration and export diversification. Within SADC 
the Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (MMTZ) Protocol allowed these 
countries quota-bound duty-free market access to the Southern Africa Customs Union 
(SACU) group of countries comprising South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Namibia. Malawi benefitted from this through the relocation of garment firms from 
South Africa to take advantage of this as well as Malawi’s export incentives under the 
Export Process Zones initiative. As result over 4,000 manufacturing jobs which were 
created almost overnight by the footloose firms in this sector have been in danger of 
being lost just as quickly.   
The MMTZ quota protocol expired in December 20091 and Malawi failed to honour 
its obligation to implement the phase down of its tariffs in line with its offer and the 
SADC Free Trade Area trade protocol. Under these conditions SACU countries 
threatened to rescind the quota that MMTZ countries enjoyed.  
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Given the importance of the integrated cotton sector in the Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy and given the sectors’ potential for employment generation which 
we discussed above, losing quota access to export markets has long term negative 
development effects.  
The source of problems with the SACU arrangement has been Malawi’s fears of 
trade revenue losses from the tariff phase down. But a recent study commissioned by the 
ministry of finance indicates that Malawi’s applied tariffs are lower than announced and 
closer to the those offered and that while the revenue losses would be incurred they are 
not significant enough for the economy to forego important advantages lost through 
retaliation, such as alternative revenues sources such as corporate income tax, economic 
integration and employment, and foreign exchange (Kaluwa and Jung, 2009).  
New export sectors – Wood products 
The recent export performance of wooden products and furniture though still 
relatively minor illustrate how Malawi can diversify its production and export bases. 
Developments taking place in the cotton and textiles sector involve foreign players in 
supporting growers and the subsequent processing stages. The wooden products and 
furniture exports too involve Raiply a subsidiary of a Kenyan corporation. The exports 
involve taking strategic advantage of much lower return freight rates offered by foreign 
transporters of import into Malawi. A Zimbabwe based road haulier of imports suggested 
they could offer up to a third of the rates applying to Malawi’s imports instead of the 
trucks returning without a pay-load or loading up with ballast. The same could be 
negotiated for exports of furniture to the Middle-east via the Tanzania route.  
6.3 Capital account policies 
Capital account liberalisation 
While the current account in Malawi was liberalised in 1994, the capital account 
remains relatively un-liberalised. Liberalising the capital account is not a pressing issue 
for the IMF program in Malawi. Given Malawi’s commitments under the WTO the 
capital account management measures have been limited to a relatively small number of 
controls. These are detailed in the table below. 
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Table 13. Malawi: Controls on the capital account 
Type of Control 
 
Limits/Control 
Inflows  
    Foreign exchange exposure Commercial banks 35% of core capital   
    Foreign participation in TBs (foreign reserves protection) 10% of total stocks 
    Foreign borrowing Financial soundness (ability to pay and cost) 
    FDI Exchange Control (RBM) registration and 
evidence of inflows 
    Portfolio -Do- 
Outflows  
   Outward investments RBM permission required 
   Dividends ( FDI & Portfolio) Evidence re: registration, declaration of and 
payment of dividends, taxation 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi authorities. 
 
Inflows – Among the notable measures are controls regulating foreign exchange 
exposure related to foreign investor participation in commercial banks. These inflows are 
portfolio investments in a sector that is highly profitable but does not lend itself directly 
to the structural change that the economy requires as compared to FDI. This also 
potentially raises outflows through dividends.  
There are also limits on foreign participation in the treasury bill market. For the 
same reasons as foreign exchange exposure, this restriction is especially important 
considering government borrowing has pulled the TB rates to above 30 per cent between 
1995 and 2001, and often above 40 per cent. The table below suggests that there had 
slippages on limits to foreign participation in the TB markets. But more importantly it 
also suggests that falling yields may have an impact on the inflows during the financial 
and economic crisis.  
Table 14. Levels of foreign participation in treasury bills, TB yields, pre-and post-crisis 
Date Participation (% of Total) Yields (91 Days) 
Pre-Crisis 16 33.6 (2000-2007), 13.9 (2007) 
2007, Nov  10.5 10.04 
2008, April 5 10.16 
2008, Nov-March, 2011 <1 7.23 (June 2010) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi authorities, Financial and Economic Reviews 
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Outflow – Just as inflows are linked to potential outflows through dividends so are 
investment outflows linked to eventual dividends inflows. In 2009 Southern Africa had 
an outward FDI stock of US$ 69 billion dominated by South Africa (US$ 64 billion) 
followed by Angola (US$4 billion) (UNCTAD, 2010). Malawi’s outward FDI stock was 
a modest US$ 22 million. In Malawi the two sectors that have been that have been 
particularly active are the wholesale/retail led by a South Africa/Malawi consortium, 
Metro Cash & Carry and the insurance sector led by National Insurance Company 
(NICO) going into Zambia and Tanzania respectively. Lately Malawi’s largest 
commercial bank, National Bank of Malawi has also expressed similar 
6.3.1 External sector recommendation three – This report argues that Malawi 
should continue to maintain controls on short term capital inflows.  
The literature provides reasoning for this. Helleiner (2003) argues that following the 
Second World War nearly all industrialised countries managed their capital accounts. 
During their periods of take-off in growth, many emerging economies managed portfolio 
and other capital flows. These include Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Malaysia, 
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China (UNCTAD, 2009 p87).  
During periods of crisis such as the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the recent 
global financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 some countries and regions of the 
world can become relatively attractive as destinations of foreign investment flows 
because of high returns to investment or they can become relatively riskier. International 
capital flows tend to be pro-cyclical with excess inflows during booms and capital flight 
at the hint of instability, deepening economic downturns. Moreover capital inflows by 
appreciating a country’s real exchange rate hurt structural change and growth by making 
tradeables sectors uncompetitive and discouraging investment. Hence capital controls 
can offer stability by countering short-term and volatile flows and stabilising real 
exchange rates.  
The G-20 Ministerial Meeting of 23 October, 2010 stressed the need for the IMF ad 
member countries to work towards external sustainability by among other measures 
limiting excessive risk. Since the Asian crisis experience with unregulated capital flows 
the IMF and other institutions have become more receptive to capital management 
though their preference would be for temporary market based techniques (UNCTAD, 
2009, p88). 
6.3.2. External sector recommendation four – Attract FDI into strategic economic 
sectors which have potential for export growth, productivity growth and labour 
absorption.  
As Table 14 shows FDI inflows into Malawi are small compared with many 
countries in southern Africa.  
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Table 14 Foreign direct investment in southern Africa. 
 FDI Inflows FDI Outflows 
 (Millions of dollars) 
 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
 
Source- World Investment Report 2010 
According to the World Investment Report 2010, Malawi received low inflows if 
foreign direct investment and also ‘underperforms’ in its existing capacity to attract 
foreign investment. This is due to several reasons including its landlocked position, poor 
infrastructure, high import costs as well as an ineffective regulatory framework (Ministry 
of Industry, Trade and Private Sector Development 2007).  
Foreign investment can generate employment-enhancing growth in specific sectors 
by filling in existing capital and skills gaps, by transferring new technologies and by 
enhancing export competitiveness. There are a range of incentives in place to attract 
foreign investment into Malawi. Further policy efforts to attract foreign investment 
should explicitly target sectors with employment creation potential – the integrated 
textile and cotton sector being an obvious candidate for this.   
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Section seven 
A summary of recommendations 
 
1. Monetary policy recommendation one – Reduce commercial bank excess 
liquidity. 
This report argues for a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to reduce commercial bank 
liquidity and to channel excess liquidity into priority productive sectors. We suggest the 
Reserve Bank takes an inventive approach to this issue and reduces liquidity in a way 
that could generate job-rich growth. We propose the following two options. 
a) The Reserve Bank could link commercial bank reserve requirements to lending for 
priority sectors, which include sectors with high employment generating potential. Hence 
it would allow a proportion of lending to these sectors to qualify as banks’ eligible 
reserves. This therefore involves a strategic direction of credit by the state by using the 
‘carrot’ of the reserve ratio as a policy instrument.  
b) An ‘excess liquidity tax’ could be used as a ‘stick’ to discourage commercial banks 
from inefficient hoarding of cash. In other words, commercial banks will be disciplined 
as they can be if liquidity levels fall below the Reserve Banks stipulated ratio.  
2. Monetary policy recommendation two – A greater developmental role for the 
reserve bank of Malawi  
The Reserve Bank can play a role in mobilising resources for micro-finance 
institutions (MFIs), small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and priority sectors that have 
a high potential for creating new jobs. Instruments such as concessional loans and loan 
guarantee programs can be used for this. 
3. Monetary policy recommendation three – The paper recommends adjusting 
interest rates to take account of seasonality in agriculture.  
We propose that a wide band of interest rates are used strategically to incentivise 
seasonal operation decisions and to promote long-term crop diversification. This can 
boost agricultural productivity as well as increase employment and incomes in the rural 
sector.  
4. Fiscal Policy Recommendation One – Target Fiscal Policy to Boosting Priority 
 Sectors  
Expenditure on priority economic sectors that enable structural change and 
diversification should increase if Malawi is to embark on a path of job-rich growth. Such 
sectors include export-oriented and vertically integrated sectors such as cotton and 
textiles should be developed in Malawi.  
5. Fiscal policy recommendation two – Facilitate increased private investment 
through fiscal incentives and by complementary public investments that 
‘crowd in’ private investment.  
State investment in priority sectors should aim at facilitating increased private 
sector participation. There are some areas of economic infrastructure provision into 
which the private sector can be encouraged to enter, for instance private-public 
partnerships could be considered in electricity generation. The government needs to 
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provide fiscal incentives for this and to regulate the private sector (in particular through 
competition policy) so that the objective of easing this infrastructure constraint is met. 
6. Fiscal policy recommendation three – Increase government expenditure on 
skill and capability creation  
Skill development should be undertaken through government expenditure. This is 
an area where private sector involvement is likely to be unsuitable for meeting national 
objectives. In particular, the ‘missing middle’ of skills in Malawi should be targeted. 
Skill development should be closely integrated into overall policy for structural change 
and diversification. Hence expenditure should focus on skills needed by priority sectors. 
7. Fiscal policy recommendation four – Design an exit strategy from the maize 
subsidy and increase public investment in irrigation. 
It is time to also think of an exit strategy from expenditure on maize. This has to be 
gradual and sequential, for instance by a gradual reduction of the subsidy for maize and 
an increase in subsidy for other cash crops. Our recommendation of an exit strategy from 
maize does not have the objective of deficit reduction. Instead, we see this as part of an 
overall strategy to improve diversification within agriculture so that the sector grows in a 
way that generates a significant increase in decent jobs and in incomes.  
8. Fiscal policy recommendation five – Increase the efficiency of public 
expenditure 
Boosting employment-rich growth also requires improving the efficiency of public 
expenditure. The 2006 Public Expenditure Review notes that the efficiency of education 
expenditure is low. Efficiency gains are crucial if Malawi is to reach the goal of universal 
primary education by 2015. Reaching this goal requires a 40 per cent increase in 
recurrent expenditure in education.  
9. Fiscal policy recommendation six – Improve efforts at revenue mobilisation.  
While gains have been made in revenue mobilization in recent years, increased 
efforts are necessary to expand the tax base and to improve tax collection. The informal 
sector as well as formal sector enterprises that often operate in informal sector can be 
targeted.   
10. External sector recommendation one – This report argues for a devaluation of 
the Malawi Kwacha 
Devaluation is necessary to ease the current very serious foreign exchange shortage 
which disrupts supplies of imported inputs and stalls production and also raises import 
costs due to interest charges by foreign suppliers and buyers. This foreign exchange 
constraints need to be eased as part of a macroeconomic policy package aimed at 
creating employment-rich growth. 
11. External sector recommendation two – Increase competitiveness of the export 
sector 
Malawi’s exports are very limited in scope and the degree of export diversification 
is very low. Increasing the labour absorption capacity of the Malawian economy call for 
growth and structural change in the export sector. The creation of a diversified and 
competitive export sector that generates decent jobs must be targeted using a range 
51 
exchange rate and supply side policy instruments. Macroeconomic policies alone are 
insufficient for this.  
12. External sector recommendation three - This report argues that Malawi should 
continue to maintain controls on short term capital inflows 
International capital flows tend to be pro-cyclical with excess inflows during booms 
and capital flight at the hint of instability, deepening economic downturns. Moreover 
capital inflows by appreciating a country’s real exchange rate hurt structural change and 
growth. In this context capital controls can counter short-term and volatile flows and 
stabilising real exchange rates. Controls can give policy makers additional instruments 
for effective and less costly macroeconomic stabilisation measures, while promoting 
efficiency and growth.  
13. External sector recommendation four – Attract foreign direct investment into 
strategic economic sectors which have potential for export growth, 
productivity growth and labour absorption 
Malawi attracts low inflows if foreign direct investment due to several reasons 
including its landlocked position, poor infrastructure, high import costs as well as an 
ineffective regulatory framework. Foreign investment can generate employment-
enhancing growth in specific sectors by filling in existing capital and skills gaps, by 
transferring new technologies and by enhancing export competitiveness. There are a 
range of incentives in place to attract foreign investment into Malawi. Further policy 
efforts to attract foreign investment should explicitly target sectors with employment 
creation potential – the integrated textile and cotton sector being an obvious candidate for 
this.   
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